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Abstract
Though the brain and its neuronal states have been investigated extensively, the neural correlates
of mental states remain to be determined. Since mental states are experienced in first-person
perspective and neuronal states are observed in third-person perspective, a special method must
be developed for linking both states and their respective perspectives. We suggest that such
method is provided by First-Person Neuroscience. What is First-Person Neuroscience? We define
First-Person Neuroscience as investigation of neuronal states under guidance of and on orientation
to mental states. An empirical example of such methodological approach is demonstrated by an
fMRI study on emotions. It is shown that third- and first-person analysis of data yield different
results. First-person analysis reveals neural activity in cortical midline structures during subjective
emotional experience. Based on these and other results neural processing in cortical midline
structures is hypothesized to be crucially involved in generating mental states. Such direct linkage
between first- and third-person approaches to analysis of neural data allows insight into the "point
of view from within the brain", that is what we call the First-Brain Perspective. In conclusion, First-
Person Neuroscience and First-Brain Perspective provide valuable methodological tools for
revealing the neuronal correlate of mental states.
Introduction
We experience events in the environment. We are con-
scious of some of the events we experience. We thus expe-
rience mental states in first-person perspective. In
contrast, we never observe mental states in other persons
and thus in third-person perspective. Instead of other per-
sons' mental states, we can observe their brains with its
neuronal states. Due to this dissociation between first-
and third-person perspective, mental and neuronal states
have often been considered separately and isolated from
each other ultimately resulting in dualism between brain
and mind [1]. It should be noted that we do not intend to
imply that this description reflects the historical develop-
ment in the philosophy of mind. From a historical point
of view the development might be considered as vice versa
(see e.g. [2] for a more detailed discussion).
However, the modern imaging techniques allow new
insights and on-line access to the brain while experiencing
mental states in first-person perspective. In order to reveal
the true neuronal correlates of mental states, first- and
third-person perspective must be linked to each other.
Such linkage requires a special methodological approach
where both perspectives are directly related to each other.
This has been discussed recently under the heading of
"first-person methodologies" [3,4]. Here we want to
Published: 17 March 2006
Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine2006, 1:3 doi:10.1186/1747-5341-1-3
Received: 25 October 2005
Accepted: 17 March 2006
This article is available from: http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
© 2006Northoff and Heinzel; licensee BioMed Central Ltd.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
Page 2 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
present an outline of such an approach with respect to
neuronal states, First-Person Neuroscience.
In a first section definition and concept of First-Person
Neuroscience are presented. This is followed by demon-
stration of an empirical example, an own fMRI study on
emotions, where both approaches first- and third-person
are directly compared to each other. The results reveal the
crucial role of neural processing in cortical midline struc-
tures in generating emotional mental states. We here focus
on emotional mental states. Therefore it remains unclear
to what extend this also applies to mental states in general
as well to the distinct features of mental states. In the final
section, epistemic implications of such First-Person Neu-
roscience shall be discussed. We suggest that First-Person
Neuroscience presupposes a "point of view from within
the brain" which we call First-Brain Perspective.
First-Person Neuroscience: Definition and 
concept
What is First-Person Neuroscience?
First-Person Neuroscience uses methods for the systematic
examination and evaluation of mental states by them-
selves and their contents as experienced in first-person
perspective and links them with data about neuronal
states as obtained in third-person perspective (Figure 1).
Such methods include, for example, phenomenology and
introspective psychology that may be regarded as steps
towards the development of a "science of experience" (see
also [5] for the distinction between introspection and
phenomenological analysis). Linkage between first- and
third-person data in First-Person Neuroscience depends
on and thus presupposes a reliable and detailed account
of the first-person data by themselves and thus a 'science
of experience'. The better the first-person data are
accounted for the better and more promising their linkage
with third-person data: "Thus, for example, a large-scale
integration mechanism in the brain such as neural syn-
chrony in the gamma band should be validated also on
the basis of its ability to provide insight into first-person
accounts of mental contents such as duration. The empir-
ical questions must be guided by first-person evidence"
[5]; (see also [1,3,6-8]). This, however, contrasts with
most current empirical approaches that investigate the
brain only in third-person perspective. Empirical investi-
gations of brain states focus exclusively on neuronal states
and presuppose therefore only the third-person perspec-
tive. This approach may subsequently be called Third-Per-
son Neuroscience.
Third-Person Neuroscience can be defined by empirical
investigations of brain states in the third-person perspec-
tive. It is therefore necessarily restricted to neuronal states
and cannot account for subjective mental states, which
remain inaccessible in third-person perspective. First-Per-
son Neuroscience, in contrast, can be defined by the
empirical investigation of brain states in orientation to
systematic epistemic linkage between First- and third-per-
son perspective; this accounts for empirical linkage
between mental and neuronal states. As a result First-Per-
son Neuroscience focuses on the development of meth-
ods for the systematic linkage between First- and third-
person data: "Third, it would be futile to stay with first-
person descriptions in isolation. We need to harmonize
Linkage between mental and neuronal states in "First-Person Neuroscience" Figure 1
Linkage between mental and neuronal states in "First-Person Neuroscience".
“First-Person Mentoscience”
Experience of mental states in
First-Person Perspective
“Third-Person Neuroscience”
Observation of neuronal states in
Third-Person Perspective
“First-Person Neuroscience”:
Investigation of neuronal states in 
relation to mental states in “First-
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and constrain them by building the appropriate links with
third-person studies. .... To make this possible we seek
methodologies that can provide an open link to objective,
empirically based description." [3].
Observation in third-person perspective, as presupposed
in physics and Third-Person Neuroscience, remains insuf-
ficient by itself in the empirical investigation of the men-
tal states since the latter can be accessed only by
experience and thus in First-Person Perspective. This has
already been pointed out by Hume who, relying on one of
his current interpreters emphasized the role of introspec-
tion: "Hume sought to adapt the experimental method of
Newton to the investigation of the powers and principles
of the human mind launched by Locke. Here we have said
"adapt" rather than "adopt", because Hume did not think
that physical experiments could be performed on the
mind. Rather, he thought that the mind's workings are
accessible to introspection, and that by careful introspec-
tive study of one's own conscious states, one would be
able to discover general principles that apply to those
states; much as by carefully studying the operations of
physical objects Newton had discovered general princi-
ples applying to them, such as the laws of motion and
gravitation. The result of this essentially introspective
study of the mind was to be a truly empirical science of
human nature" [9].
Often, methods for evaluation of mental states and those
for their linkage to third-person data have been subsumed
under the term "First-Person Methodologies" [3]. Moreo-
ver, First-Person Neuroscience is often equated with Sec-
ond-Person Neuroscience. A Second-Person Neuroscience
focuses on those mental states that can be detected in sec-
ond-person perspective by means of introspection or
"phenomenal judgment" [1]. For example, investigation
of neural correlates of consciousness may be considered a
paradigmatic example of Second-Person Neuroscience or
"neurophenomenology" [5]. It should be noted that the
term "phenomenal" includes both conscious and uncon-
scious states in order to account for the full range of men-
tal states as experienced and judged in First- and Second-
Person Perspective. Despite these differences in the range
of mental states, Second-Person Epistemology is often not
differentiated from First-Person Neuroscience (see, for
example, [5,6]). In the following use of the term "First-
Person Neuroscience", Second-Person Epistemology is
included for pragmatic purposes. It should also be noted
that we presuppose a rather broad meaning of the term
"neuroscience". It includes all disciplines involved in the
direct or indirect empirical investigation of the brain rang-
ing from psychology over neurocomputation to neuroge-
netics. However, not all mental states, as experienced in
first-person perspective, are conscious and can conse-
quently be detected and recognized in second-person per-
spective. Second-Person Neuroscience is therefore not
necessarily identical to First-Person Neuroscience since
the latter covers a broader spectrum of mental i.e. uncon-
scious and conscious states than the former which
remains restricted to conscious states. An example of
'First-Person Neuroscience' as distinguished from 'Sec-
ond-Person Neuroscience' consists in the investigation of
the neural states underlying psychodynamic and thus
unconscious processes. For example, certain psychody-
namic parameters, which were altered in patients with cat-
atonic schizophrenia, correlated significantly with
deactivation in orbitofrontal cortex during emotional
stimulation [7,10,11].
How can First-Person Neuroscience be implemented in 
empirical research?
First-Person Neuroscience provides the linkage between
mental and neuronal states. Methodologically, the link-
age between neuronal and mental states is provided by
"disciplined circularity" or a so-called "neuro-phenome-
nological circulation" [5] between neuronal and mental
states where both can be considered as "mutual or recip-
rocal constraints" for each other in neuroscientific investi-
gation. This, in turn, provides indirect access to the neural
correlates of mental states. There may be different meth-
odological strategies for linking neuronal and mental
states in an empirical investigation.
First, the contents of mental states can be related to neu-
ronal states. For example, different types of emotions i.e.
positive, negative, disgust, happiness, etc. may be related
to distinct spatio-temporal activation patterns in the pre-
frontal cortex [12-14]. However, the problem that arises
here is that the contents, as determined and categorized in
third-person perspective for empirical investigations of
mental states, may not necessarily be identical with the
ones as experienced in first-person perspective.
Second, the neuronal states underlying the subjective
experience of mental states may indirectly be accounted
for by the combination of different methods of analysis.
One such methodological approach that provides linkage
between First- and third-person perspective in empirical
investigation of brain states, can be characterized as "dou-
ble analysis". In "double analysis", the same data are ana-
lyzed with regard to both objectively and subjectively
correct answers. For example, subjects have to decide
whether certain presented items are blue or black. They
may make correct decisions about the color of these items.
In addition, they may make some mistakes by pointing
out the wrong color. Data about neuronal states, obtained
during the process of decision, may be grouped and ana-
lyzed in two different ways. First, all items classified cor-
rectly as blue, may be compared with those classified
correctly as black. This type of analysis would be a Third-Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
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Person analysis since only items classified as objectively
correct, according to third-person perspective, are
grouped together. Second, all items classified as blue
(thus also including the ones wrongly classified as blue)
may be compared with all those classified as black (thus
also including the ones wrongly classified as black). This
type of analysis would be a First-Person analysis since all
items classified as subjectively correct, according to first-
person perspective, are grouped together. Results from
both types of analysis may be compared with each other.
Differences between the results from both analyses may
reflect the difference between subjective and objective
classification and thus between first- and third-person
perspective.
Third, different characteristics of the subjective experience
itself may serve as a guide and orientation for the analysis
of data regarding neuronal states. The characteristics of
subjective experiences may be revealed in a so-called
"phenomenological analysis" [5]. Relying on "introspec-
tion" and "phenomenological analysis", a so-called "phe-
nomenological cluster" [6] may be elucidated. For
example, different "phenomenological clusters" were
revealed by means of subjective questioning i.e. introspec-
tion during the time course of visual illusions. These dif-
ferent temporal "phenomenological clusters" then served
as the guide for analysing different brain rhythms in the
respective "subjective" time intervals. Different time inter-
vals and thus different "phenomenological clusters" could
indeed be characterized by different brain rhythms (theta,
alpha, beta, gamma) [6]. Another example of such a "phe-
nomenological analysis" would be the analysis of fMRI
data in orientation to the phenomenological concepts of
temporality i.e. "phenomenal time" [15]. Lloyd observed
that the multivariate distance and changes between brain
images is approximately linearly related to their temporal
distance. The more closer acquired in time the more sim-
ilar the images. Thus, the changes between the different
images occur gradually over time. Lloyd argues that these
results are consistent with Husserl's description of time
consciousness in that they reflect the inexorable temporal
flux of the conscious state. Analogous to the way that each
moment of our phenomenological experience of time
builds on foundation of the previous moment, the series
of fMRI images appears to form a continuously evolving
temporal pattern of global activity.
First- and Third-Person Neuroscience: Empirical 
example
How can neuronal states be investigated in first- and third-
person perspective?
We want to present an empirical example for the compar-
ison between a first- and third-person approach to inves-
tigation of neuronal states, an fMRI study on emotions
[16]. It should however be noted that emotional experi-
ence presents a special case of mental states. Thus it
remains unclear to what extend these results may be gen-
eralised to other mental states.
Another important distinction in this context is Ryle's dis-
tinction between episodic and dispositional mental states
with the former being timed and introspectable while the
latter cannot be timed off/on and infallibly introspected
[17]. What we here focus on are episodic mental states,
the mental states in relation to the presented emotional
pictures. It may however be the case that the regions dis-
cussed below, the cortical midline structures, could also
underlie our continuous dispositions for certain mental
states and thus what Ryle calls dispositional mental states.
Based on a well validated affective picture system (Inter-
national Affective Picture System; IAPS) emotions can be
classified into positive, neutral, and negative categories by
the investigator – this can be called third-person or cate-
gorical approach. The investigation of the neural corre-
lates of these positive, negative, and neutral emotional
categories can subsequently be characterized as Third-Per-
son Neuroscience. Here the neural correlates, as for exam-
ple obtained with fMRI, are related to the emotional
categories as determined by the third-person perspective
of the investigator.
However, emotions must be considered as special case
since they are inherently subjective. Even the classification
of emotions into positive, negative, and neutral categories
relies ultimately on subjective continuous ratings in first-
person perspective, performed by those subjects which
served as the basis for determination of the standard
valence scale. Consequently, investigation of the neuronal
basis of the different emotional categories (positive, neg-
ative, neutral) combine data of both first- and third-per-
son neuronal correlates.
How can we separate the neuronal correlates belonging to
continuous emotional experience in first-person perspec-
tive from those associated with categorical distinction of
emotions in third-person perspective? First-Person Neuro-
science provides a special methodological approach for
elucidation of the first-person neuronal correlates. One
can classify emotions not only according to the third-per-
son categories of the investigator but also with respect to
the continuous first-person experience of the investigated
subjects. The continuous first-person experience can for
example be obtained on a visual analogue scale with a
continuum between 1 and 9 of emotional valences – this
continuous or parametric analysis can be called first-per-
son approach. In this case, the first-person experience of
the emotions can directly be related to the neuronal corre-
lates as measured in fMRI. Such a direct relation is possi-
ble since the emotional experience has been transformedPhilosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
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via a visual analogue scale into numerical values that can
be correlated with the values resulting from the fMRI
measurement. It has to be considered that the numerical
values are not identical with the emotional experience
itself. In a next step one might then compare the fMRI
results from both approaches, the categorical or third-per-
son versus the parametric or first-person analysis. If both
analyses reveal different regions, the neuronal correlates
of third-person categorization of emotions can be sepa-
rated from the first-person (parametric) experience. As
such the neuronal correlates specifically underlying first-
person experience and thus mental states can be revealed
and separated from those associated with third-person
observation.
What are the differences between first- and third-person 
analysis of emotions?
In an fMRI study (13 subjects) on visual experience (IAPS)
of emotional pictures [14,16], we compared both
approaches, the parametric first-person and the categori-
cal third-person approach.
Two types of statistical analyses of the fMRI data were per-
formed. In a first step, we adopted a categorical analysis.
The constructed regressors were the presented pictures,
irrespective of their emotional valence. The main purpose
of this analysis was to detect the regions responsible for
neural processing during the presentation of the IAPS pic-
tures in general.
In a second step, we adopted a parametric analysis using
the valence ratings (1–9) as modulation parameter. As in
the first step it was tested against baseline. The valence val-
ues used for this analysis were taken from the SAM ratings
of our subjects. This was to assure that the appropriate
(i.e., individually rated) valence values were applied to
the analysis for each subject.
The analysis tested for a linear relationship between
regional signal changes and valences of IAPS pictures and
thus valence-dependent modulation of signal intensity in
particular regions.
The linear relationship of the changes in the BOLD signal
with the valence values was further illustrated by showing
the regressions for local maxima of the BOLD signal from
the parametric analysis.
And indeed we obtained different results in both analyses.
The third-person approach revealed several regions across
the whole cortex whereas the first-person approach
showed only regions in the cortical midline, the orbito-
medial (OMPFC) and dorsomedial (DMPFC) prefrontal
cortex and the medial parietal cortex (MPC) (Table 1 and
Figure 2; see [16] for further details).
The first step, the categorical analysis, revealed multiple
significant foci of signal change in the comparison of IAPS
picture viewing with our baseline condition. Significant
signal changes were observed in cortical midline regions
such as the OMPFC (x = -2, y= 54, z = 14; Z = 3.65) and
the DMPFC (x = 4, y = 48, z = 40; Z = 3.68) (Table 1).
Moreover, significant signal increases were observed in
the bilateral posterior parietal cortex (x = -48, y = -67, z =
28; Z = 3.36) (x = 50, y = -63, z = 25; Z = 3.34), the poste-
rior cingulate (x = 0, y = -38, z = 40; Z = 3.83) and the tha-
lamus/hypothalamus (x = 0, y = -8, z = 4; Z = 3.39) (Table
1).
Table 1: Signal changes as obtained in categorical or third-person and parametric or first-person analysis.
Signal changes in categorical analysis 
(third-person)
Signal changes in parametric analysis 
(first-person)
Orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (OMPFC) -2/54/14, 3.65 16/56/19, 3.35
Dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) 4/48/40, 3.68 12/48/24, 3.29
Medial parietal cortex (MPC) - -2/-34/60, 3.68
Insula - -54/-10/14, 4.32
Bilateral posterior parietal cortex -48/-67/28, 3.36; 50/-63/25, 3.34 -
Thalamus/Hypothalamus 0/-8/4, 3.39 -
Posterior cingulate 0/-38/40, 3.83 -
X, y, z: MNI coordinates in mm. X describes right (+)/left (-), y anterior (+)/posterior (-), and z superior (+)/inferior (-) distances (e.g. 21/23/43, 3.45 
≅ x = 21/y = 23/z = 43, Z = 3.45). Coordinates of the local maxima of regional signal increases are given. Z = Z-score. Only signal increases with Z 
> 3.29 (p < 0.001, uncorrected, voxel level) are described.
Signal changes associated with categorical analysis reflect the comparison between the IAPS picture categories and the baseline condition. (Left 
column)
In contrast, the parametric analysis tested for a linear relationship between regional changes in the BOLD signal and valence of the presented IAPS 
pictures as rated by the investigated subjects. The IAPS pictures were modeled as a regressor according to their valence ranging from 1 to 9. The 
parametric signal changes were tested against the baseline condition. Regions are listed that show a positive linear relationship between valence and 
BOLD signal changes. (Right column)
Note the overlap between both comparisons with regard to involvement of OMPFC and DMPFC. The other regions, in contrast, were either 
involved in categorical or parametric analysis.Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
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The second step, the parametric analysis, tested for a pos-
itive correlation between the changes of the valence and
the linear change of the BOLD signal. It revealed valence-
dependent modulation of signal intensity in the OMPFC
(x = 16, y = 56 and z = 19; Z = 3.35; close to the pregenual
anterior cingulate) and the DMPFC (x = 12, y = 48 and z
= 24; Z = 3.29). Other regions showing valence-dependent
modulation included signal increases in the MPC (x = -2,
y = -34, z = 60; Z = 3.68) and the left insula (x = -54, y = -
10, z = 14; Z = 4.32). It should be noted that both compar-
isons overlap with regard to the involvement of the
OMPFC and DMPFC. The other regions, in contrast, were
either involved in categorically- or parametrically-ind-
nuced signal changes. The posterior cingulate showed sig-
nal changes only in the categorical analysis, whereas
involvement of the medial parietal cortex was revealed
only in the parametric analysis (Figure 2).
Accordingly, it seems that as if there are regions in the
brain, the so-called cortical midline structures [18], which
are specifically related to the first-person experience of
emotions. More generally, these regions have been
assumed to be involved in any type of first-person experi-
ence and thus in mental states since they seem to prefer-
entially process self-referential stimuli as distinguished
from non-self-referential ones [18].
This example demonstrates that the linkage between first-
and third-person perspective can yield additional infor-
mation, i.e., that cortical midline regions seem to be asso-
ciated specifically with first-person experience. This
information is not provided by mere third-person
approaches to emotions where the first-person neuronal
correlates cannot be isolated from the ones underlying
third-person observation. Methodological strategies for
the linkage between first- and third-person data about
mental and neuronal states need to be more refined and
developed in the future. It can be expected that they will
provide us with insight into the neuronal correlates of
mental states. Based on my own and others results (see
[18] for an overview), we hypothesize that cortical mid-
line structures are crucial in generating subjective experi-
ence of mental states.
First-Person Neuroscience: First-Person 
Perspective and First-Brain Perspective
What is the First-Brain Perspective?
In philosophy, experience of mental states in first-person
perspective has been characterized by "What is it like for a
person (or bat) to experience (or generate) that particular
(mental) state?" [19] (see also Figure 3) whereas observa-
tion of neuronal states in third-person perspective can be
described by "What is the neuronal state?" (see also Figure
4). The first-person perspective reveals insight into the
experience of mental states whereas the third-person per-
spective provides access to observation of neuronal states.
Either perspective however does not consider the respec-
tive other state, mental states are ignored in third-person
perspective whereas neuronal states are neglected in first-
person perspective. If one combines both, one might
access one's own brain in first-person perspective. This
reveals those neuronal states that are experienced as men-
tal states in first-person perspective. One can conse-
quently speak of a First-Brain Perspective [1] and
formulate the corresponding "What is it like" sentence:
"What is it like for the brain to generate those neuronal
states which are experienced as mental states?" (see also
Figure 5).
Scientific investigation of mental states in isolation from
neuronal states in what may be called First Person Mento-
science (see [1] for details). First Person Mentoscience pre-
supposes the first person perspective as characterized by
mental states. The mental states, associated with first per-
son perspective, however are investigated from third per-
son perspective. One thus gets an objective account of
subjective or first person states, i.e., of mental states in a
scientific way resulting in what we call First Person Men-
toscience. Nagel also speaks of an "objective phenome-
nology" [[20], see also [21]]. In contrast scientific
investigation of neuronal states in Third-Person Neuro-
science presupposes the third-person perspective. Which
perspective is presupposed in First-Person Neuroscience?
As demonstrated, First-Person Neuroscience provides
linkage between neuronal and mental states and thus
between third- and first-person perspective. This allows
access though indirectly to the brain itself, i.e., what is it
like for the brain to generate those neuronal states which
are experienced as mental states in first-person perspec-
tive. This presupposes a point of view "from the inside of
the brain", i.e., "viewing the brain from within" [22]. We
call this point of view First-Brain Perspective. Since this
point of view is presupposed, First-Person Neuroscience
can be characterized by the First-Brain Perspective. The
First-Brain Perspective considers neuronal states in orien-
tation to mental states, i.e., it allows insight into the
brains' neuronal states in relation to mental states.
Why is First-Person Neuroscience necessary?
We have no direct access to our own brain as a brain
because we do not experience our own neuronal states as
neuronal states in first-person perspective. Instead, we
experience mental states in first-person perspective. Men-
tal states in first-person perspective appear thus independ-
ent of the brains' neuronal states as observed in third-
person perspective. Scientific investigation of mental
states as experienced in first-person perspective might
thus be independent of observation of neuronal states in
third-person perspective – one might thus speak of First-
Person Mentoscience [1].Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
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Due to the dissociation between mental and neuronal
states with respect to first- and third-person perspective,
both types of states have been investigated independently
of each other. Subsequently, "neuronal/physical constitu-
ents and mental constituents" were distinguished from
each other: "Physical phenomena can be analyzed into
their physical constituents, with the aid of scientific exper-
imentation, and mental phenomena can perhaps be ana-
lyzed into their mental constituents at least in some cases,
but these two path of analyses do not meet" [23]. In other
terms, First-Person Mentoscience and Third-Person Neu-
rocience remained independent of each other resulting in
methodological dualism with isolation between neuronal
and mental states.
First-Person Neuroscience attempts at overcoming and
bridging such methodological dualism between First-Per-
son Mentoscience and Third-Person Neurocience. This is
made possible by the complementary and mutually exclu-
sive abilities in First- and third-person perspective. In first-
person perspective, we can experience our own mental
states but have no access to our own neuronal states – this
Parametric or first-person modulation in cortical midline regions during emotional picture presentation Figure 2
Parametric or first-person modulation in cortical midline regions during emotional picture presentation. a) 
Upper part. FMRI images represent results from a random effects group analysis (n = 13) depicted on a standard MNI brain. X, 
y, z: MNI coordinates in mm. X describes right (+)/left (-), y anterior (+)/posterior (-), and z superior (+)/inferior (-) distances. 
Z = Z-score. Only regions with Z > 3.29 (p < 0.001, uncorrected, voxel level) are described. The aim of the analysis was to 
characterise the parametric modulation of the BOLD-signal during the presentation of IAPS-pictures. To that end we adopted 
a parametric analysis using the valence ratings (1–9 rated by the subjects in a post hoc analysis) as the modulation parameter, 
which was tested against baseline. Parametric modulations of regional signal intensities during presentation of IAPS pictures 
were obtained in OMPFC (x = 16, y = 56, z = 19; Z = 3.35), DMPFC (x = 12, y = 48, z = 24; Z = 3.29; visible in the coronal 
image), MPC (x = -2, y = 34, z = 60; Z = 3.68) and left insula (x = -54, y = -10, z = 14; Z = 4.3). b) Lower Part. The parametric 
relationship between picture valence (x-axis, valence values from 1 [negative] to 9 [positive]) and signal percent change (y-axis, 
intensity change of the BOLD signal) during viewing of IAPS pictures is demonstrated. The regional local maxima of valence-
dependent modulation were correlated with the picture valences. Parametric valence-dependent modulation of signal percent 
change was found in the following regions during IAPS picture viewing: The OMPFC (x = 16, y = 56, z = 19; Z = 3.35), the 
DMPFC (x = 12, y = 48, z = 24; Z = 3.29) and the MPC (x = -2, y = -34, z = 60; Z = 3.68). OMPFC = orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex, DMPFC = dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, MPC = medial parietal cortex.
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inability can be called "autoepistemic limitation" [1].
Whereas in third-person perspective, we can observe oth-
ers' neuronal states but have no access to their mental
states – this inability can be called "heteroepistemic limi-
tation" [1]. First-Person Neuroscience links both first- and
third-person perspective and can therefore relate mental
states to neuronal states. To answer the question heading
this section: First-Person Neuroscience is necessary
because there is "autoepistemic limitation" in first-person
perspective (and "heteroepistemic limitation" in third-
person perspective). As such First-Person Neuroscience
provides the methodological tools for compensating our
inability to directly experience our own neuronal states as
neuronal states in first-person perspective. It provides an
escape from "autoepistemic limitation" by offering a
First-Person Perspective Figure 3
First-Person Perspective.
Experiential access to 
mental states Perspective of the person itself
First-Person Perspective
“What is it like for a person 
to experience a mental 
state?”
“First- Person Mentoscience”
Third-Person Perspective Figure 4
Third-Person Perspective.
Empirical access to neuronal states  Perspectives from other persons
Third-Person Perspective
“What is the neuronal state?” “Third- Person Neuroscience”Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 2006, 1:3 http://www.peh-med.com/content/1/1/3
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method for indirect access to the neuronal states of our
own brain.
Conclusions and conceptual considerations
First-Person Neuroscience provides a methodological
approach that can contribute to a better understanding of
mental states. By linking first- and third-person perspec-
tive, it may help to overcome the dualism between the two
perspectives. We suggest that this epistemic dualism
might be resolved by developing a new perspective, First-
Brain Perspective, which unifies and entails the specific
properties of first- and third-person perspective. Though
in this paper, we mainly focus on the empirical implica-
tions of such first brain perspective, i.e., the methodolog-
ical approach of First Person Neuroscience, we at least
want to indicate some philosophical issues.
It may for example be argued that first-person perspective
and third-person perspective constitute conceptual con-
tradictions. Development of a unifying perspective, such
as first brain perspective is then impossible for conceptual
reasons (e.g. [24]) resulting in what may be called epis-
temic dualism. Other argued that mental phenomena per
se are part of a wrong theory of mind, which will be
replaced by future results of empirical neuroscience (e.g.
[25,26]. In this case there is no need to postulate any first
perspective be it related to a person, i.e., first-person per-
spective, or to the brain, i.e., First-Brain Perspective.
Therefore the eliminative materialism may be considered
as an epistemic monism.
What is common to epistemic dualism and monism is
that they make the assumption of First-Brain Perspective
impossible, either for being conceptually contradictory, as
in epistemic dualism, or for being empirically superfluous
as in eliminative materialism. It is therefore clear that our
approach that postulates a First-Brain Perspective must
undermine the alternative between epistemic dualism and
monism by taking an intermediary stance. However, what
remains unclear is how such an intermediary stance might
look like. For example, it has to be discussed whether the
First-Brain Perspective represents a mere conjunction
where both perspectives are purely linked to each other.
Or whether it is a genuinely unifying ground underlying
and necessarily entailing first- and third-person perspec-
tive. In the latter case the First-Brain Perspective would
need to be characterized by states different from both neu-
ronal and mental states since otherwise it would not be
genuinely unifying. This may be something like Nagel
envisions when he speaks of the "right point of view" The
right point of view (i.e. First-Brain Perspective) would be
one which, contrary to present conceptual possibilities,
included both subjectivity and spatiotemporal structure
from the outset, so that it would describe inner states and
their functional relations to behavior from the phenome-
nological inside and the physiological outside simultane-
First-Brain Perspective Figure 5
First-Brain Perspective.
First-Brain Perspective
Unifying and underlying ground for 
perspectives of person itself and 
other persons
Empirical access to neuronal states 
in relation to mental states
“What is it like for the brain to 
generate those neuronal states 
which are experienced as 
mental states?”
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ously – not in parallel. "The mental and physiological
concepts and their reference to this same inner phenome-
non would then be seen as secondary and each partial in
its grasp of the phenomenon: each would be seen as refer-
ring to something that extends beyond its ground of appli-
cation" [23]. It is clear that the description of the First-
Brain Perspective given here in the empirical context of
first-person perspective falls far short from the conceptual
requirements postulated by Nagel. Therefore, the pre-
sented concept of First-Brain Perspective may be consid-
ered, if at all, a starting point, which needs further
conceptual elaboration, especially with regard to the vari-
ous philosophical implications.
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